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Abstract
The paper explores the link between authoritative media, which is called
the public court in the paper, and economic prosperity. Three types of
evidence are used. First, arguments of the superiority of the public court
over traditional media are provided. Second, a formal model shows a
causal effect from more authoritative media viewers to greater political
efficiency. Finally, the paper presents an overview of empirical literature
on the link between political efficiency and economic prosperity. The
finding of the paper is that the public court facilitates economic prosperity
regardless  of  whether  the  traditional  media  are  politically  biased  or  not.
1I. Introduction
The standard economic theory does not view media as a separate player in the economy. In
reality, however, the media play an important role in society. The existence of media and its
importance in our everyday life is apparent. Still, the papers that analyze the role of media in
economics have appeared very recently and their number is limited. The fact that media has a
great influence on economy is appreciated by the World Bank that perceives media as a
mechanism in reducing corruption, explaining economic processes and shaping the public’s
opinions in pre-election periods (World Bank Institute Programs, 2007). As regards published
papers, a few noticeable ones follow.
Ahrend (2002) uses international panel data and finds that more press freedom causes less
corruption and suggests that strengthening press freedom should be among priorities in the
fight against corruption. Djankov et al. (2003) examine the patterns of media ownership in 97
countries and find that usually the largest media firms are owned by the government or by
private  families.  Empirically  they  also  find  that  greater  state  media  ownership  is  associated
with a greater number of journalists jailed and media outlets closed by the government.
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) build a model that shows that competition between
newspapers does not necessarily lead newspapers to deliver unbiased news, and only a reader
with access to all news sources is guaranteed to get unbiased information given that there is
sufficient reader heterogeneity. Baron (2006) presents a theory of media bias that originates
with private information obtained by journalists who have career interests and are willing to
sacrifice current wages for future opportunities. Finally, Besley and Prat (2006) develop a
model  of  democratic  politics  in  which  media  capture  is  endogenous.  The  model  offers
insights into the features of media market that determine the ability of the government to
exercise such capture and hence to influence political outcomes.
2However, if there are several papers available that link media and economics, then to the
best of my knowledge there is none that would attempt to show the link between authoritative
media and economic prosperity1. Therefore, I try to fill the gap with this paper.
My hypothesis is that an authoritative media is critical in bringing politicians and the
public together. It is not enough for journalists simply to mirror the news to the public. In the
age of information, the public may overlook important issues occurring in their country.
Therefore, the media needs to weed out important issues and tell the public why and how
those issues may influence them. For example, there is a journalist who runs a live broadcast
debate on specific issues in Latvia (Tv.lv, 2007). In the broadcast, there are opposing parties
and some neutral experts. The journalist also expresses his views but tries to be neutral. The
journalist asks from the responsible parties their actions and if the issue is not solved in that
debate, he organizes another debate later and asks what the responsible parties have done to
solve the issue. The journalist has gained the public’s trust and the public expresses its views
through online voting during the debate. Furthermore, the responsible parties also respect him
because the debate is popular among the public and because the mediator critically expresses
about the persons who have not come to the debate for doubtful reasons. Thus, the invited
parties are forced to come to the debate and be well prepared because otherwise they lose the
public’s  trust.  As  a  result,  the  debate  has  raised  the  public’s  interest  in  politics,  revealed
several corruption cases and forced the responsible parties to act according their best intents.
In  this  thesis  I  argue  that  a  particular  type  of  authoritative  media  that  I  call  a  “public
court” is reasonable enough to exist and might be good for economic prosperity. In order to
achieve the goal, I come up with three types of evidence showing that:
1. the “public court” set up is superior over traditional media;
2. media can have influence on the effort exerted by politicians;
1 I define authoritative media as media whom the public trusts and politicians respect.
33. political effectiveness yields higher economic growth.
The thesis is organized as follows. Section II shows that there are a number of reasons to
think of authoritative media as a better means to influence a politician’s effort than the
traditional media. Section III comes up with a simple model illustrating how media can
increase  political  efficiency.  Section  IV  provides  a  short  review  of  the  literature  of  the
relationship of the political efficiency and economic prosperity. Section V concludes.
II. Authoritative vs. traditional media
In  this  section,  I  call  for  a  need  for  the  public  court  and  argue  that  there  are  a  number  of
reasons  to  think  of  the  public  court  as  at  least  as  good  or  even  better  than  the  traditional
media, where with the latter I call newspapers, traditional news on the television and radio,
and the part of the Internet that can be attributed to traditional news, including electronic
newspapers.
It is widely known that in fifth century Athens, which was inhabited by approximately
250,000 people, five thousand of them (on average, one sixth of fully paid-up citizens - adult
males of Athenian birth and full status) might have regularly attended one or more meetings
of the popular Assembly, of which there were at least 40 per year in Aristotle's day (Athens
Think Twice, 2007; The Democratic Experiment, 2007). That political system was an
antecedent to modern political systems that we encounter in democratic countries. Modern
political systems which anticipate an active role from the public in politics only once in, say,
four years, seems to be an appropriate one, given that it is too costly or even impossible to
give political decision-making rights to each individual. However, during the past few
decades the velocity of information has changed dramatically. In the age of information,
when in many countries the majority of voters has access to the Internet and could
4theoretically participate in political decision-making more frequently without much extra
costs, the current political system is likely be inefficient2. I expect that the first best would be
if the public redeemed its rights for political decision-making on daily basis via the Internet,
given that all citizens had their unique electronic signature and access to the Internet. While
the first best is a challenge for modern societies, the model which I present in this paper, is
already successfully existent in many countries. Though, it seems that it is not yet spotted by
economists.
I argue that there is a need for an institution which I call “the public court” that would
play a role of an effective medium between the politicians and the public. The name of the
institution is due to the similarity of its structure to courts. The public court can be in the
form of weekly online television debate between opponents. There should be also neutral
experts and the moderator-journalist (judge) who would have to be an authority to the public.
The public (jury) expresses its opinion by online voting. This public court in a form of public
debate would ask the political responsibility from the politicians and would give incentives to
politicians to work harder, and be paid back by shifts in public support. I claim that such an
institution performs better as an important news provider than the traditional media in several
aspects.
First, it gives incentives for politicians to work harder. There is a reason to believe that
the more politics is discussed in the public, the greater incentives are for politicians to work
hard because there is a greater probability that the actual effort of the politician will be
revealed. I italicize the word ‘discussed’ because that is what debates do better compared to
2 Note that not only the frequency of interactions between the public and politicians, but also the representation
has changed since Ancient Athens. For example, the coefficient of representation in Ancient Athens was about 2
percent (5,000 over 250,000); today in Latvia it is about 1
229
 percent, or 100 deputies over the population, and
in Poland it is about 1688  percent, or 460 deputies plus 100 senators over the population (authors calculations).
5news given by the traditional media.  Similarly, politicians are less eager to shirk or engage in
bribing or other hidden activities because public discussions increase the probability of those
activities to be detected. Second, it decreases time allocated for political intrigues, populism
and other inefficient activities because there is a higher probability that the mediator and the
public will detect such behavior through discussions between opponents. Therefore, the
allocation of the time of politicians improves.
Third, one can think that a general public is not interested in politics. On the contrary, I
think that the public is interested in politics very much. The problem is that many people do
not believe that they can influence the political process, and, therefore, they simply give up
following the politics. To my mind, that is the result mainly from long time periods between
elections, and the nature of the traditional media. While the former was discussed at the
beginning  of  the  section  and  is  not  directly  related  to  media,  the  latter  involves  two  main
features.   First,  the  traditional  media  is  constructed  in  such  a  way  that  there  is  hardly  any
feedback from the public, i.e., the traditional media is mainly one-way information flow from
politicians to media to the public. The reader of the newspaper reads an article, thinks about
it, and continues her daily activities. There is no sufficient way how a reader (or, similarly,
viewer on listener) can give a quick and substantial feedback that would be taken into
account3. The public court deals with this problem at least in two ways. First, it involves
online public voting during the debates. In this regard, by voting, a person instantaneously
sees that her opinion is visible to politicians and other public members. Therefore, the person
feels better by being aware that she can participate in making the public’s voice. Second,
since the public court is run once in a week, the mediator can choose his own topic of
discussions. This is a crucial distinction between the public court and the traditional news
because usually the traditional news does not have many options to choose from; it is just the
3 This problem is less severe in the Internet, where it is allowed to write comments.
6main news of the day. The mediator of the public court has much wider option to choose the
topic of a discussion, and the public can help him a lot, by giving suggestions and comments.
Like an ombudsman, the authoritative mediator has a close relationship with the public, and
he translates the concerns of the public to the topic of a discussion. Thus, this is another way
how the public court encourages and facilitates the public’s active monitoring and discussion
of political events. The second feature of the public court is that it is more interesting to
watch than the traditional news. A short article in a newspaper or a similar report on
television in many cases do not cause a great interest in the public and passes by without
many comments. On the contrary, a hot discussion involving top politicians may attract the
public like a TV show. A member of the public might find it attractive to watch the public
court instead of a football game or a soap opera. Therefore, given the above mentioned
features of the public court, the public might change its preferences from pure entertainment
towards politics just because the public court offers more interesting form of translation of
news.
Fourth, the public court increases the public’s memory by maintaining and repeating
issues. The traditional media usually states the current news without much thorough analysis.
It can repeat issues (say, high inflation rate) time after time but still traditional news usually
never offers a solid analysis of the situation. This is acceptable because the main function of
the traditional news is informing the public about current events. If politicians are ignorant
about the issue, or just lazy, they can repeatedly declare that they work hard on the issue (and
the traditional news will transfer that announcement to the public). On the contrary, an
authoritative mediator would invite opposing parties as well as experts to the discussion and
dig to the ground of the problem. Moreover, a mediator would repeatedly organize
discussions about the same issue until the dispute is solved. The public would know the true
cause of the problem, and would follow the progress of its solution. In the election day, there
7is a higher probability that the public will remember the true actions of politicians and will
react accordingly.
Fifth, and related to the above, the public court decreases the public’s uncertainty about
the future because the public gets a better picture about what politicians think and do and
what their reasons are. Further, it increases the efficiency of politics due to the fact that the
public and politicians work together4, say in tax payments, when combating inflation, on
salary issues in the public sector, on policy priorities and many other issues where joint effort
of both politicians and the public is required for a successful result. Finally, the public court
leads to less biased news compared to the traditional media. For example, Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005) say that in order to lessen the information bias, one needs to read many
different newspapers because any single newspaper might be politically biased. By reading
several different newspapers, a reader gets a broader picture of different views. I argue that
the public court in the form of online discussions is obviously less biased as a source of
information than any single traditional media outlet because it usually has discussants with
different opinions. This can be illustrated mathematically as follows.
Let ix  be a realization of a random variable ~x F , where x  is a political stance with a
distribution function F . Assume the expected value ( )E x  is the ‘true’ or unbiased value of
news and assume the expected value exists5. Assume that a single newspaper has an article
with [ , ]ix a b?? ?  and can be far from the objective political view ( )E x . In order to get less
biased news, a reader may read more than one paper. Or, she can watch the public court, in
which there are n  participants and therefore we have a set of realizations
4 This is true in long run, and also in short run if politicians are opportunistic. The public court is a mechanism
that helps the public not to reelect selfish politicians (see more about opportunistic and selfish politicians in the
next section).
5 It does not exist, for example, for the Cauchy distribution.
81 2{ , , , }nA x x x? ? ?? . If the participants have equally supportive evidence for their political
stances, then 1 i
i
x x
n
? ?  is the estimator of ( )E x . The authoritative mediator may help the
public to put weights on each argument, in which case we get i i
i
x x???? , where 1i
i
? ?? ,
i?  - weight for the persuasiveness of the politician i ’s argument and here it proxies for the
probability of ix . It is straightforward to prove that both x  and x?  are better estimators of
( )E x  than ix . This example clearly shows that the public court provides less biased
information than a single newspaper. Moreover, the public court may be better than reading
n  different newspapers because the former is run by a mediator who wisely chooses the
participants and helps the public to put weights on different arguments.
Given all the former, the economy is more efficient when there is the public court because
the time/money of both politicians and the public is allocated more efficiently. Thus, these
are the reasons to think that such a public court is good for economic prosperity.
Obviously, the efficiency of the public court is in hands of the public itself. Here I present
the approximate conditions such that the public court can be set up.
1. the host medium of the public court is benevolent/non-profit (at least in short run;
after the debate gets popular, this institution might get profitable) and independent
from politicians;
2. the public can find an authoritative journalist whom to trust and who would run the
debate;
3. some politicians have private interests that are not always in line with the public’s
interest but they have incentives to work harder given that they are afraid of (or have a
disutility from) the public’s anger and/or they like the public’s support;
94. the public has some interest in politics and has a memory long enough so that it can
punish/award the politicians at the day of the election.
While the second to fourth conditions can be fulfilled easily in almost every country, the
first condition is crucial since the private television stations care mostly about the profit and,
therefore, are less likely to allocate their time to the public court at its infancy. So, the
independence of state media is important for establishing the public court.
The next section is to come up with a simple model that integrates the idea developed in
this section to show that the public court is desirable in order to increase the effort extracted
by a politician.
III. Media, the public court and political efficiency
In the previous section I argued that the public court is in several ways a better news provider
than the traditional media. Surely, not all the news can be discussed thoroughly due to, say,
time limits. Therefore, in reality most probably there will be both traditional media and the
public court, and the most politically debatable news left to the latter.
Given that the above conditions for the public court setup are satisfied, the role of both
traditional media and the public court in shaping political efficiency is formally represented
by the following simple model which is based on Besley & Burgess (2002). They use their
original model to show that state governments in India are more responsive to falls in food
production and crop flood damage via public food distribution and calamity relief
expenditure where newspaper circulation is higher and electoral accountability greater.  I
generalize the model so that it can be used for any country and stress the role of the media
more clearly by changing the definitions of variables and incorporating the effect of the
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public court. Further, I study the effect of biased traditional media on the capability of the
public court to shift the incumbent’s effort level.
Consider a two-period model in which at the beginning of period 1 a politician has been
voted  into  office.  Citizens  are  of  two  kinds:  those  who  use  the  media  to  get  news  from
politicians (fraction ? ,  “media  users”)  and  those  who  do  not  (fraction 1 ?? , “the ignorant
ones”)6. In period 1, a fraction ?  of media users watch online political discussions (“the
public court”), and a fraction 1 ??  use only “passive” traditional media. 7 Assume for now
that the traditional media are overall unbiased. Later on I will relax this assumption.
The politician can extract effort [0, ]e E?  during the period of stay in the office. There
are three types of politicians: :a  “altruistic”  who  always  put  in  the  maximal  effort E , :s
“selfish” who never put in effort, and :o  “opportunistic” who put in effort if it enhances their
reelection. Let i?  be the utility for holding the office for type { , , }i a s o? .
The politician’s effort is not directly observable. However, the size of the effort that has
been put in can be learned from the media. The extent of media activity (e.g., a number of
media outlets) is denoted by m . Let ( , )q e m  be the fraction of the traditional media users
who learn about the incumbent’s effort and are going to vote for her. Similarly, let ( , )p e m  be
the fraction of the public court viewers who learn about the incumbent’s effort and are going
to vote for her. Given the arguments in the previous section, assume that the public court
increases the reaction of the public to the incumbent’s extracted effort compared to the
6 Not endogenized since it depends on many things, like traditions, income, education, the amount of spare time,
and the quality and availability of media. See later in the section about one way how to endogenize it.
7 I assume the public court already exists and the main precondition for its establishment is independent state
media. If the state media are dependent from politicians, the public court is not established, and 0? ? .
However, if the state media are free, the creation of the public court itself can be quite spontaneous. For
example, in Latvia it was established by the initiative from a small group of intelligentsia.
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traditional media, i.e., assume ( , ) ( , )e ep e m q e m? . Additionally, let (0, ) 0q m ? , (0, ) 0p m ? ,
( , ) 0mq e m ? , ( , ) 0mp e m ? , ( , ) 0eq e m ? , ( , ) 0ep e m ? , ( , ) 0emq e m ? , ( , ) 0emp e m ? ,
( , ) 0eeq e m ? , and ( , ) 0eep e m ? . Thus, the fraction of media users who learn about the
incumbent’s  effort  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  incumbent’s  effort,  and  a  greater  media
activity is assumed to increase the marginal impact of effort. Since both functions ( , )q e m
and ( , )p e m  represent the reaction of the public to the incumbent’s effort, I call them the
reaction functions. They are depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Reaction functions of the traditional media users and the public court viewers given
the incumbent’s exerted effort.
Figure 1 shows that the popularity of the incumbent in both media populations is an
increasing function of the incumbent’s effort. If no effort is put in, the public is neutral to the
politician. If a positive effort level is exerted then the public learns about it through media,
and is ready to vote for the politician to some extent. The discussion in section II is helpful to
understand why the reaction function for the public that watch the public court (RFPC) has a
higher slope than the reaction function for the population that users traditional media (RFTM).
Once again, the idea is that the public court has a comparatively higher ability to assess the
effort extracted by the incumbent. So, there is a higher share of the particular population that
e
( , )q e m
( , )p e m
RFTM
e1
RFPC
q(e1,m)
p(e1,m)
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learns about the incumbent’s effort level. Moreover, since the public court viewers have a
better notion about the politician’s effort, they can react to these efforts more clearly. This
relates further to higher reaction of the public’s support to the incumbent. Note that the result
is  that  a  positive  effort  is  learned  better  by  the  public  court  viewers  compared  to  the
traditional media users. Intuitively, the presence of more public court viewers will facilitate
the incumbent’s will to raise effort level.
After the information about the effort is realized, there is an election in which an
incumbent is faced by a randomly selected challenger. In this model8, an election is the only
instrument in the public’s hands in order to punish or award the incumbent. Since the
opportunistic incumbent has no further reelection concerns, only the altruistic one will extract
effort in period two. For this reason, the media viewers will prefer to vote for the politician
who has been shown to have put in effort in period one, since such a politician is definitely
not selfish.
The fraction of the media users (both of the traditional media and the public court) who
learn about the incumbent’s effort level and are willing to vote for her is
( , , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ).s e m p e m q e m? ? ?? ? ?        (1)
All of these citizens vote for the incumbent9. A fraction 1 s?  are those who do not learn
from the media about the incumbent’s effort level, and, therefore, they do not vote since they
are tired of watching news and not learning about the politician’s effort level10. They could
8 More or less, it is also in reality.
9 Note that the public will vote for the incumbent as long as there will be a positive probability of selfish
challenger to appear.
10 This assumption is quite realistic because if this fraction voted, then the model would have 100 percent
activity. In a real world, however, there is always a fraction of electorate that does not participate in elections. It
is reasonable to think that exactly those people who expect to but do not see the politician’s effort refrain from
voting. Nonetheless, the fundamental result also holds if I assumed that those who do not learn voted randomly.
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also vote for the challenger. Since this model deals only with the incumbent’s problem and it
does not involve the votes for the challenger in her problem, then from the incumbent’s point
of view, it does not matter whether a fraction of the public votes for the challenger or does
not vote at all.
All the ignorant ones vote for ether the incumbent or the challenger randomly since they
have no clue which politician is better and they usually do not even care. Let ~ (0,1)U?  be
the fraction of the ignorant ones that will end up voting for the incumbent11.
The incumbent wins the elections if
1(1 )
2
s? ? ?? ? ? .      (2)
The probability that the incumbent wins if she extracts effort e  is easily computed as
11
2
1 2 (1 ) 1 1( | , , , )          (1 ),
2(1 ) 2 2
10                            (1 ).
2
if s
sP win e m if s
if s
?
?? ? ? ??
? ?
? ??
?
? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??
?
? ? ???
(3)
An opportunistic incumbent chooses her effort level by solving
max{ ( | , , , ) }oe P win e m e? ? ? ? ,      (4)
where I assume for simplicity that the cost for the politician from extracting effort e  is equal
to e .
11 Note that this model does not allow for political advertising that would influence the outcome ?  which would
then be less uncertain. Political advertisement would positively correlate with ( )E ?  and/or ( )Var ? .  Thus a
political advertisement would be used as a substitute for effort, i.e., more political ad would require less effort.
Thus, as we will see later, political ad generally is bad for political efficiency and economic prosperity, except
for the cases when political ad could be used as a complement for effort (e.g., for newly established parties).
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Both ?  and s  are assumed to be known to the incumbent. Although I admit that there is
some uncertainty in those variables, they still can be estimable if the incumbent tries hard.
For example, ?  can be estimated by summing up the average circulation of all newspapers
per day and the audience of Internet portals, radio and television programs that involve
related news. Variable s  is more difficult to estimate because it involves three quantities to
evaluate but still one can have a rough grasp of its size. Although, as regards to practical
computation, the incumbent does not need to know ?  and s  separately and still can have a
notion of the size of their product.
If the estimated product is greater than 1
2
, the incumbent will surely be elected in the
next period and, therefore, she has no need to extract effort. This situation can be
characterized by the lack of political competition. Further, if 1 (1 )
2
s? ?? ? ?  then the
incumbent has no chances to be elected and, therefore, again has no incentives to extract any
effort. This is when the incumbent is unpopular due to some reasons, and/or there is too
severe political competition. The incentives for the incumbent to extract effort are for
moderate political competition where ?  and s , for example, are 3
4
? ? , 5
8
s ? . Nonetheless,
the existence of an interior solution can be extended by complicating the model.
Assuming the interior solution, the first order condition for the optimal effort level e?  is
? ?( , ) (1 ) ( , ) 1
1 e e o
p e m q e m? ? ?? ? ? ? ??
? ? .           (5)
From the FOC, we have the following results:
Equilibrium effort e?  extracted by the politician is higher the greater is the
(i) media activity (greater m );
(ii) fraction of media users (greater ? );
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(iii)fraction of the public court viewers (greater ? ).
The results of the model are intuitive. Greater media activity allows a politician to think that
her effort will be broadcasted more thoroughly, be it in one medium or another. Further, a
greater fraction of media users increases the probability that citizens will know about the
politician’s extracted effort and will vote for her. Finally, because the public court is a more
efficient  news  provider  than  the  traditional  media,  the  politician  has  more  incentives  to
extract effort when there are more public court viewers. Thus, the model predicts that the
existence of the public court is good for political efficiency.
Until  now  I  had  assumed  that  the  traditional  media  are  overall  unbiased.  However,  the
media can be politically biased towards either the incumbent or challenger. Below I analyze
the effect of the public court on the incumbent’s effort under biased traditional media.
If the traditional media are biased towards the challenger then the reaction curve RFTM in
Figure  1  goes  down  or  slopes  less  steeply,  and  as  a  result  for  the  incumbent  it  is  more
difficult to be reelected. In this case, the incumbent either does not have a chance to be
reelected and exerts zero effort, or if she still has a chance to be reelected then she exerts a
higher reaction to an increase in ? . A more difficult case to describe is when the traditional
media are biased towards the incumbent. Let us study three different cases.
First, the reaction function of the traditional media users can be horizontal (see Figure 2).
In this case it does not matter how much effort the incumbent puts in because her loyal media
outlet always informs the public in a manner that is of benefit to the incumbent. The fraction
( )q m  does not depend on effort level but on the persuasiveness of the media and the extent of
a bias. The incumbent has a guaranteed share of the public that will vote for her, so she faces
less uncertainty. Moreover, if 1( , ) (1 ) ( )
2
p e m q m?? ? ?? ? ?  then she is certain to be reelected
and extracts zero effort. If 1( , ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
2
p e m q m?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  then she has no chance to be
16
Figure 2. The reaction function of the traditional media users does not depend on the
incumbent’s effort level due to the traditional media bias towards the incumbent.
reelected12. Finally, if the incumbent finds herself in the interior solution then an increase in
?  will encourage her to exert more effort, and this effect will be greater than in the baseline
model.
Second, the reaction function of the traditional media users can be shifted upwards (see
Figure 3).
Figure 3. The reaction function of the traditional media users is shifted upwards as a result of
the traditional media bias towards the incumbent.
12 However, this is highly unlikely because then the incumbent probably would be better off if the media were
not biased towards her; so, if the bias occurs then it is to such an extent that the incumbent has a chance to stay
in power.
e
( , )q e m
( , )p e m
RFTM
e1
RFPC
q(m)
p(e1,m)
e
( , )q e m
( , )p e m
RFTM
e2
RFPC
q(e2,m)
p(e2,m)
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In  this  case,  if  we  denote  the  size  of  upward  shift  by d  then the incumbent is reelected if
1(1 ) (1 )
2
s d? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? . So, the incumbent has a “bonus” (1 )d? ??  from the media
bias. The “bonus” consists of three parts. One part comes solely from the extent of the media
bias d . Another part,1 ?? ,  depends  on  the  share  of  the  media  users  who watch  the  public
court. The smaller this share, the higher is the “bonus”. The third part is the fraction of media
users. The larger is the fraction of media users, the higher is the “bonus”. The higher is the
“bonus”, the less likely that the incumbent will exert effort. If, however, the incumbent find
herself in the interior solution then the baseline results hold, i.e., the incumbent’s exerted
effort is a positive function of the share of the public that watch the public court.
Finally, and less likely, the reaction function of the traditional media users can slope
upwards to such an extent that its slope is higher than the reaction function of the public court
viewers (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. The reaction function of the traditional media users has a higher slope than the
reaction function of the public court viewers due to the traditional media bias towards the
incumbent.
If this is the case then the baseline model predicts that the higher the share of the public court
viewers, ? , the less effort will be exerted by the incumbent. This means that the public court
is not desirable if the traditional media incline towards the incumbent in the fashion presented
e
( , )q e m
( , )p e m
RFTM
e3
RFPC
q(e3,m)
p(e3,m)
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in Figure 4. This statement stands against the intuition that the public court is good for
political efficiency regardless of the political stance of traditional media. In order to cure this
problem of the baseline model, I endogenize the fraction of the public that use media, ? . My
argument  is  that  the  public  likes  a  freedom  of  choice  between  different  media.  If  the  only
media available to the public is the biased traditional media then the public is less keen to
watch such news. Because the public court provides more objective information, the public
shows more interest in news, and, thus, the fraction of the public that use media is likely to be
a function of the existence and scale of the public court, i.e., ( )f? ?? , 0?? ? 13. Under
endogenized ? , the FOC for the incumbent becomes
? ?( ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) 1
1 ( ) e e o
p e m q e m? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ??
? ? .           (5`)
If the fraction of the public court viewers goes up, the ratio before the brackets in (5`) goes
up, and the expression in the brackets goes down (because now ( , ) ( , )e ep e m q e m? ).
Therefore, the result is unclear and depends on the shape of ( )? ?  and the reaction curves:
2
2
   e
(1 )
   e .
(1 )
e e
e e
if q p then
if q p then
?
?
? ??
? ??
? ? ?? ??
? ? ?? ??
     (6)
Intuitively, if more public court viewers increase the total share of media users sufficiently,
then it is likely that the incumbent will react by exerting more effort. If, however, the media
market is saturated so that 0?? ? , it is more likely that the incumbent will decrease her effort
level. In such a case, it is better to cope with the biased traditional media by increasing media
outlets such that they increase media competition and reduce the traditional media bias.
13 Similarly but less importantly for the current problem, it can be argued that ?  is a function of number of
media outlets, m .
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In  this  section,  I  have  shown  that  the  existence  of  the  public  court  might  increase  the
effort of politicians when the traditional media are overall unbiased. Moreover, I have also
shown that the result generally holds if the traditional media are politically biased. Still, in
order to show that the public court is good for economic prosperity, I need to come up with
one more type of evidence, i.e., that political efficiency increases economic prosperity. For
this  I  am  going  to  briefly  discuss  the  empirical  literature  in  this  regard  since  it  is  a  well
established result by many authors.
IV. Political efficiency and economic prosperity
The literature about the effects of the political environment on economic prosperity is well
developed and far too voluminous to summarize adequately. Here I mention a few of the
most recognized empirical papers on this topic. However, since there is no such index as
political efficiency out there, and since the number of indices that can be good proxies for
political efficiency is limited, most empirical works take corruption and bureaucratic quality
indices as the most frequent proxies for political (or governance) efficiency.
Mauro (1995, 1996) is one of the earliest attempts to empirically measure the impact of
corruption on economic prosperity. Mauro (1995) runs cross-country OLS and IV regressions
and provides tentative empirical evidence that corruption lowers investment and growth.
However, due to several arguable approaches in the analysis and its conclusions, the results
of the paper should be approached with caution. Mauro (1996) uses a larger data set than a
year before. In addition, the author is more cautious about his results. He concludes that
corruption may have considerable adverse effects on economic growth, largely by reducing
private investment but also perhaps by worsening the composition of public expenditure.
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Specifically, the paper gives some evidence on a negative and significant relationship
between corruption and government expenditure on education.
Employing various indicators of institutional quality, including the pervasiveness of
corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation, Knack and Keefer (1997)
empirically show that the economic divergence of poor and rich countries has taken place
because of different institutional environments of these groups of countries.
In addition to Mauro (1995, 1996) who finds that corruption reduces growth through
lowering private investment, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) find another way how corruption
affects growth. They use cross-country OLS and find that higher political corruption
decreases economic growth by increasing public investment, lowering government revenues
and lowering the quality of public infrastructure. They argue that while corruption increases
public investment, it decreases its productivity, since more corrupt governments tend to
invest in large projects and forget about expenditures on operations and maintenance as well
as on education and health; the latter results in deteriorating infrastructure, lower productivity
and lower economic growth.
Rodrik (1998) analyze data for East Asia, runs IV estimation of growth on institutional
quality index and finds that the latter explains well the growth differences among the East
Asian countries.
Gupta et al. (1998) contributes to the literature by analyzing distributional effects. They
use cross-country OLS and IV regression analysis for 1980-97 to demonstrate that high and
rising corruption increases income inequality and poverty by reducing economic growth, the
progressiveness of the tax system, the level and effectiveness of social spending, and the
formation of human capital, and by perpetuating an unequal distribution of asset ownership
and unequal access to education. The authors argue that these findings hold for countries with
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different growth experiences, at different stages of development, and using various indices of
corruption.
Hall and Jones (1999) study the relation between social infrastructure and output per
worker. They argue that output per worker is more appropriate as a proxy of wealth than
growth since growth is mostly a transitory phenomenon. Their proxy for social infrastructure
is a simple average of law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation
and government repudiation of contracts indicators. Similarly to Tanzi and Davoodi (1997),
they find that social infrastructure mainly causes change in output through productivity. The
authors run OLS and IV estimations and conclude that differences in social infrastructure
account for much of the difference in long-run economic performance throughout the world,
as measured by output per worker.
In IV analysis of the cross-section of more than 150 countries from a newly available
database, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) find that there is a strong causal
relationship from better governance to better development outcomes such as higher per capita
incomes, lower infant mortality, and higher literacy.
Chong and Calderon (2000), among other things, study the causality of different measures
of corruption and bureaucratic quality, and economic growth. They find that the poorer
country is, the higher the influence of those measures of institutional quality on growth.
Wei (2000) adds to the literature by studying the effect of corruption on international
investors. His sample covers bilateral investment from twelve source countries and 45 host
countries. He estimates a probability model by OLS and ML, and finds that a rise of
corruption level in a host country reduces inward foreign direct investment.
Kaufmann and  Kraay  (2002)  propose  a  new empirical  strategy  to  estimate  the  causality
between corruption and per capita income. They use international data to estimate the effect
of governance on per capita income. The authors find both OLS and IV estimated coefficients
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on government effectiveness and control of corruption significant. They conclude that there is
a positive and significant effect from better governance to higher per capita incomes but vice
versa is not true. That is, higher per capita income does not generate better governance.
 Carmignani (2004) estimates single equations and systems of equations by GLS, SURE
and IV, and finds that good institutions increase average income and growth as well as
income of the poor. He constructs the governance variable as a simple average of government
effectiveness, control of corruption, rule of law and regulatory burden indices. The results
from the cross-sectional analysis show that the governance variable significantly and
positively correlates with income, income of the poor, and growth, and negatively correlates
with the Gini index of income inequality. The author contributes to the field by finding a
nonlinear relationship between governance and distribution of income.
One of the recent papers is produced by Eicher and Leukert (2006) who examine the
impact of economic institutions on economic performance across OECD and non-OECD
subsamples using OLS and IV estimation methods. They define the economic institutions the
same way Hall and Jones (1999) do. The authors find that the impact of institutions on
income is three times greater for non-OECD countries compared to OECD countries.
To conclude from the empirical literature on the relation of the political effectiveness and
economic  prosperity,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  papers  show  that  increasing  the
political effectiveness causes a rise in economic growth, per capita income for average and
the poor.
V. Concluding remarks
This  is  possibly  the  first  paper  ever  that  tries  to  show  that  authoritative  media  is  good  for
economic prosperity. In this paper I have described an institution that I call “the public court”
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which is widely existent in the world but probably not acknowledged well enough by
economists. I argued that this institution is important to discipline the politicians by giving
them more incentives to extract effort.  The whole structure of my argumentation lies in three
blocks.  First,  I  argued  that  the  public  court  is  in  several  aspects  a  better  way  of  providing
news to the public than the traditional media. Second, I used a simple model to demonstrate
that more public court viewers increase political efficiency by increasing the effort of an
opportunistic politician. Third, I gave a review of empirical literature on the relationship of
political efficiency and economic prosperity. The literature convincingly shows that greater
political efficiency induces higher economic growth, income level on average and for the
poor. Thus, given the above evidences, I argue that the public court is good for economic
prosperity and, thus, it needs to be supported by the public and the government in any
country.
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